













































10 Patterns of support for the 
welfare state
The role of media and interpersonal 
communication in direct democratic 
votes in Switzerland (1996–2004)
Lionel Marquis
Introduction
For decades, popular support for social protection policies has been the focus of 
numerous studies in social sciences and beyond. The scholarly interest has been 
further sparked by recent developments in Western countries, which came to be 
known as a widespread ‘retrenchment of the welfare state’. Against this general 
background, two focal questions are examined jointly in this chapter. The first, 
most general, question bears on the components of attitudes towards the welfare 
state. More specifically, this chapter is concerned with the antecedents of voting 
decisions, in the context of referendums on social protection measures in Swit-
zerland (1996–2004). Drawing from the literature on welfare state attitudes, the 
determinants of voting decisions can be expected to vary depending on indi-
vidual attributes such as normative orientations, cognitive skills, or utilitarian 
considerations. Long- term individual attributes will not be the focus of my 
investigation, though. Instead, special emphasis will be laid on the role of 
information in the formation of attitudes and voting decisions, and in particular 
on the role of information that derives from interpersonal communication.
 It is beyond dispute that much knowledge about ballot issues is acquired 
through information provided by political actors in referendum campaigns. 
However, a long- standing question of survey research has been to determine 
through which channels citizens collect information that they use in making their 
vote choices. At least since the seminal studies of US presidential elections in 
the 1940s, a dichotomy between media information and interpersonal informa-
tion has been put forward in the literature. Questioning the conventional wisdom 
that ‘more than anything else people can move other people’ (Lazarsfeld et al. 
1944: 158), some evidence has recently been accumulated in support of the 
thesis of ‘massive media effects’ (e.g. Zaller 1996). The available data on Swiss 
referendum votes do not allow me to pit these two hypotheses against one 
another. Rather, in keeping with recent research favouring the interactive aspects 
of media and interpersonal information, I will attempt to show whether and how 
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the two sources of influence can have conditional and reciprocal effects on one 
another (see also Morales in this volume).
 In a second step, the outlined mechanisms are investigated further by speci-
fying the role of moderators in the processing of information. Communication 
research suggests that the impact of interpersonal and media sources is facili-
tated under certain circumstances, while it is inhibited in other cases. Indeed, 
contributions by Morales, Toka and Lup in this volume strongly point to the 
role of the political context in moderating the influence of media and interper-
sonal information. Likewise, I will investigate the role of contextual variables 
in moderating media and interpersonal influence on voting in Swiss 
referendums.
Model and hypotheses
As explained above, I will address the question of how individuals use 
information delivered in referendum campaigns, distinguishing between media 
and interpersonal information. Three models can be distinguished in the polit-
ical communication literature (e.g. Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Chaffee 1975; 
Rogers 1983; Bandura 1994; Mondak 1995a; Lenart 1997; Beck et al. 2002; 
Schmitt- Beck 2003). First, an independence model postulates that media and 
interpersonal discussions have separate, non- interactive effects on opinion for-
mation. This implies that the effects of the two sources are additive. For 
example, an increase in media influence (due, say, to an intensification of 
public debate on a vote issue) is unaffected by a similar increase in interper-
sonal influence. Second, a competitive model assumes that media and interper-
sonal effects are non- additive, since they are competing – so to speak – to 
determine citizens’ voting decisions. When one of the two sources gains 
importance in shaping opinions, the other loses ground. This is because one 
source induces judgments and feelings that inhibit the acceptation of argu-
ments put forward by the other source. Third, a reinforcement model also 
claims that media and interpersonal effects are interactive, but in this case the 
interaction is positive. Put differently, media exposure enhances the impact of 
face- to-face information; the other way around, discussions work to boost the 
effect of media information.
 On the basis of these models I will formulate two hypotheses. In each case I 
proceed with alternative hypotheses because it is very difficult to tell ex ante 
which model applies to the situation at hand. As a matter of fact, the different 
models have been shown to apply to different empirical situations, depending on 
particular issues, on particular media, on the type of discussant involved, or on 
broad societal conditions (e.g. Merten 1988; Rafaeli 1990; Lenart 1994). There-
fore, the validation of one or several hypotheses is an empirical question that can 
only be addressed with empirical data.
Hypothesis 1a: Media and interpersonal communications are independent, 
non- interactive, sources of information.
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Hypothesis 1b: Media and interpersonal communications are competitive, 
interactive sources of information. Media exposure decreases the effects of 
interpersonal sources, and vice versa.
Hypothesis 1c: Media and interpersonal communications are reinforcing, 
interactive sources of information. Media exposure enhances the effects of 
interpersonal sources, and vice versa.
 I will focus my investigation of exposure to interpersonal communications to 
the case of individuals who regularly discuss politics with other people, but who 
are not asked about their own advice and do not try to influence others. These 
individuals thus most closely correspond to ‘followers’, as defined in most 
accounts of interpersonal influence. I expect followers to be most influenced by 
information gathered from interpersonal contacts, because they are assumed to 
be neither too confident in their own opinions nor tuned off from their interper-
sonal environments.
 The second focus of this chapter centres on the conditions under which the 
three above alternative hypotheses best apply. According to political communi-
cation research, several variables may play a role in this respect. However, only 
a couple of them can be tested empirically with the data at hand. I will focus on 
the moderating influence of contextual variables: the level of elite support for 
policies submitted to vote and the local climate of opinion within the voting 
population. To be sure, the effect of media and interpersonal information is also 
conditional on the influence of individual attributes such as voters’ political 
knowledge and ideology. However, for space reasons these individual- level vari-
ables will be considered here only as control variables, as further explained 
below (pp. 00–00).
 I take into account two elements of the political context. First, I argue that the 
level of elite support, as measured by votes in Parliament, matters for the forma-
tion of citizens’ preferences. All other things equal, the acceptance of proposals 
among political leaders is a first hint of their acceptability in the general popula-
tion (Lehner 1984; Sciarini and Trechsel 1996). It may be that elite support 
translates into campaigning efforts that shape the electorate’s preferences, or that 
parties’ voting recommendations are used as heuristic cues to decide on (often 
complex) ballot measures. Accordingly, the higher the acceptance of a ballot 
proposal in Parliament, the higher its approval at the polls.
 Compared to interpersonal information, mass media information is likely to 
be more reflective of the balance of power in Parliament and to be more closely 
indexed to the relative strength of the supporters’ and opponents’ respective 
campaigns. Although journalists value the norms of autonomy, objectivity and 
control over official news, they are nonetheless expected to perform their orien-
tation function by reporting on the issues and events that they perceive as 
important in the political arena (e.g. Eilders 2002). In addition, in heterogeneous 
Switzerland, media coverage is usually quite homogeneous across regions in 
spite of a segmented media system (Tresch 2008). In contrast, interpersonal 
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information is not constrained by professional norms, it is less responsive to 
the dynamics of the political agenda, it is less driven by (though certainly 
related to) elite debates and it is less nationally cohesive. In addition, inter-
personal information is more likely to match citizens’ initial opinions than 
media information. This is because citizens can avoid uncongenial informa-
tion by ‘isolating’ in  supportive interpersonal micro- contexts, whereas they 
may find it more difficult to select media sources that are consistent with their 
own political leanings (Mutz and Martin 2001). As a consequence, we may 
expect that the directional thrust of interpersonal information is more invari-
ant across levels of elite support than is the directional balance of media 
information. When elites are divided over voting issues, media coverage 
should also be relatively two- sided, while interpersonal information at the 
local level should be more clearly tilted towards one side. More importantly, 
both media and interpersonal sources are thought to be less effective as a 
function of their internal ‘divisiveness’ (i.e. two- sided information flows exert 
less influence than one- sided flows). Accordingly, in cases of elite division 
interpersonal information should prevail over media information as a determi-
nant of voting decisions – unless it is also largely divided and thus hardly 
helpful in reaching a decision.
 However, the argument can be developed to account for the contextual effect 
of interpersonal information. As a second indicator of the political context, I will 
take into account the level of support for the welfare state within local popula-
tions, in order to approximate the degree to which local communities may exer-
cise social pressure on their members. The formation of majorities at the 
community level conveys a type of social information of which many citizens 
may be partially or totally unaware, while others consciously use it to arrive at 
decisions (‘consensus heuristic’; see Mutz 1998). When local communities are 
rather critical of welfare policies, it is to be expected that interpersonal conversa-
tions have a negative impact on voting decisions; conversely, in pro- welfare 
communities, interpersonal exchanges should have a positive impact on voting 
decisions. In contrast, the influence of media information should be enhanced 
when local communities are divided over a voting issue. This hypothesis reflects 
the argument that badly structured choice situations (as should be the case of 
many citizens in divided communities) are conducive to increasing the reliance 
on the mass media (e.g. DeFleur and Ball- Rokeach 1989). Likewise, as a third 
hypothesis, I propose that the level of elite support itself, rather than (or in addi-
tion to) media information, influences voting decisions when local opinion is 
divided.
 My next hypothesis thus specifies that the influence of media and interper-
sonal sources is contingent on the directional balance of information made avail-
able in referendum campaigns.
Hypothesis 2a: In the aggregate, when political elites are divided over a 
ballot measure, the impact of media sources is inhibited and the impact of 
interpersonal sources is enhanced.
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Hypothesis 2b: In the aggregate, when local opinion is divided over a 
ballot measure, the impact of media sources is heightened and the impact 
of interpersonal sources is inhibited.
Hypothesis 2c: In the aggregate, when local opinion is divided over a 
ballot measure, the level of elite support itself is used as a voting cue.
 As sketched out above, I will test these hypotheses controlling for the effect 
of individual- level variables that have been shown to be related to voting on 
welfare- state issues. Drawing on various theoretical and empirical works (e.g. 
McGuire 1985; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; DeFleur and Ball- Rokeach 1989; 
Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Shapiro and Young 1989; Feldman and Zaller 
1992; Zaller 1992; Svallfors 1997; Andress and Heien 2001; Schmitt- Beck 
2003), I selected five individual attributes: issue knowledge, the personal sali-
ence of ballot proposals, uncertainty about the proposals, left–right self- 
placement and personal interest in the issues at stake.
Elaboration of indicators
Empirical data
My analysis is based on secondary survey data. As Swiss citizens can vote on 
ballot issues two- to-four times a year, a survey is routinely carried out in the two 
weeks following the votes. These so- called ‘Vox surveys’ are quota- sampled to 
reflect linguistic regions, gender, professions, dwelling place and age groups. All 
surveys pertaining to welfare state issues (i.e. unemployment, labour- market 
policy, pension system, education and family policy and health policy, including 
maternity insurance) were selected for analysis. Fortunately, most questions 
display a high degree of cross- temporal comparability, and all measurements 
used in this chapter were virtually identical from one ballot issue to the next. In 
total, 22 ballot issues, for which all relevant indicators were available, were 
selected in the period from December 1996 to September 2004 (see Appendix 
10.1). The surveys contain about 1,000 respondents, with the exception of three 
surveys containing about 2,000. All surveys were weighted to have the same 
number of cases, and aggregated for the forthcoming analysis.
Exposure to interpersonal communications
The measurement of interpersonal communication is based on three items 
available for the whole 1996–2004 period. The first item (polit) asked: ‘How 
often do you discuss politics with your friends and relatives? Would you say: 
often [1], rarely [2], or never [3]?’ The second item (politd) asked: ‘How often 
do other people ask you for your opinion when there is a political decision to 
take? Would you say: often [1], rarely [2], or never [3]?’. Finally, the third 
item (politu) asked: ‘If you are deeply convinced of something with respect 
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to some political issue, do you try to persuade your friends and relatives to 
share your views? Would you say that this happens often [1], rarely [2], or 
never [3]?’
 On the basis of these three items, I created a dummy variable to define a spe-
cific ‘role’ individuals may assume in interpersonal networks. The variable FOL-
LOWER is assigned to the non- zero value for all respondents who mentioned 
being often involved in interpersonal contacts (polit), but who at the same time 
reported being rarely or never asked about their opinion (politd) and stated that 
they rarely or never try to influence others (politu). In the total sample, about 17 
per cent of respondents qualify as ‘followers’. This low number is not surprising 
in light of the fact that some 60 per cent of respondents in the sample reported 
that they never or only rarely discuss politics. As argued above, followers may 
be most susceptible to information gathered in interpersonal contacts, because 
they are rather interested in politics and attuned to their interpersonal environ-
ments, but probably lack confidence in their own opinions and are open to revis-
ing them. In other words, followers can be distinguished from both ‘opinion 
leaders’ and ‘non- discussants’ (or ‘isolated individuals’; see, for example, 
Merten 1988). As a matter of fact, in a replication of the following analyses, 
adding a specific term for opinion leaders yielded no difference between leaders 
and non- discussants. Hence ‘non- followers’ will hereafter refer to all respond-
ents who are not defined as followers; that is, both people who do not regularly 
discuss politics and opinion leaders.
Media exposure
Empirical measures of exposure to mass media information are often misguided, 
because many of them fail to take into account the specific effects of different 
sources or media, which cancel each other out in the aggregate (e.g. Zaller 
1996). More often than not, information flows are two- sided and provide indi-
viduals with contradictory messages that push them in opposite directions. In 
such instances, the ‘net media effects’ are usually far smaller than the ‘total 
media effects’ that emerge when measuring the impact of each separate source 
or message.
 Respondents were presented a list of ten different media (newspapers; radio; 
television; government’s information booklet; prints; ads; street posters; letters 
to the editor; street stands; direct mailing). For each of them, they were simply 
asked to mention whether they recalled using it to make up their minds about the 
ballot issues. Hence, the data does not allow me to disaggregate the effects of 
discrete messages or discrete media outlets. However, to avoid an even more 
serious loss of quality in exposure measures due to data aggregation, I searched 
for the media with the largest effects on voting.1 For each separate issue, three 
‘pro’ (i.e. eliciting support for social protection) and three ‘anti’ media were 
retained. The responses were added in an index ranging from 0 to 3, indicating 
how many PRO- WELFARE MEDIA and ANTI- WELFARE MEDIA respond-
ents used to form their opinions.
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Contextual variables
The general context of voting ballots is made up of three variables. First, the 
LEVEL OF ELITE SUPPORT was measured as the percentage of votes in 
favour of welfare policies (or against anti- welfare proposals) that was recorded 
in the lower chamber of the Swiss Parliament (National Council). It ranges 
between 30.2 per cent and 100 per cent, with a mean of 57.5 per cent. Most anti- 
welfare majorities are to be found in the last four years of my investigation 
period (2000–2004), where, for example, proposals to reform the pension system 
faced hostility from the right- wing majority in Parliament or low- key, limited 
expansion proposals (e.g. disability insurance) were brought with substantial 
opposition before the people. As my hypotheses imply specific expectations for 
intermediate levels of elite support, the squared level of elite support will be 
entered simultaneously with the original variable.
 Second, the CLIMATE OF LOCAL OPINION is an important moderator 
variable in my model. Regardless of the operational definition of interpersonal 
communication, there is no way to guess the directional balance (i.e. pro- or anti- 
welfare) of interpersonal information received by followers and other citizens. 
Therefore, it is impossible to assign a priori a positive or negative thrust to inter-
personal conversations, which may prove detrimental for the detection of effects 
from contradictory environments. To limit this drawback, I relied on a measure 
of the climate of opinion within the respondents’ environments. I used the per-
centage of acceptance of ballot proposals in each Swiss canton, and converted it 
into a measure of acceptance of social protection. I used this measure to divide 
the sample into three subgroups corresponding to ‘one- sided anti- ’ contexts 
(0–40 per cent yes to social protection; 38 per cent of cases), ‘two- sided’ con-
texts (40–60 per cent yes; 27 per cent of cases), and ‘one- sided pro- ’ contexts 
(60–100 per cent yes; 35 per cent of cases). This measure is admittedly crude, 
since it is based on an ex post assessment of what the balance of conversations 
in large communities might have been. However, it allows me to predict in 
which direction interpersonal discussions likely pushed respondents, and in par-
ticular those that I defined as ‘followers’.
Control variables
I first control for varying baselines of support for the welfare state between the 
various ballots, as this variation has to do with the particular properties of the 
ballot proposals and is unrelated to the effect of the variables in the model. Given 
the contemporary financial situation of the Swiss state and households, policies 
that aim to reduce social protection should generate greater support for the exist-
ing welfare system than policies that seek expansion of social protection (see 
Ullrich 2000). Thus, the framing of ballot measures was assessed by distinguish-
ing three types of ballots: (1) proposals seeking EXPANSION of the welfare 
system; (2) proposals seeking RETRENCHMENT of the system; and (3) POPU-
LIST proposals.2 All votes are listed with their assigned type in Appendix 10.1.
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 Five individual- level variables were selected as control variables for predict-
ing votes on welfare state issues. First, the KNOWLEDGE variable is based on 
four questions asking respondents about (1) the general theme of the ballot, (2) 
its content, (3) its outcome (yes/no), and (4) the voting recommendation issued 
by the federal government. For each question respondents were assigned a score 
of 1 if they gave a correct answer and a score of 0 otherwise. Summing all scores 
yields a variable ranging from 0 (no knowledge at all) to 4 (‘perfect’ know-
ledge). Second, the UNCERTAINTY variable is a dummy ranging from 0 
(decision rather easy to take) to 1 (decision rather difficult, or don’t know). The 
exact question reads: ‘On the basis of received information, was it rather easy or 
rather difficult to figure out the personal consequences of [name of the project]?’ 
Third, I measured the respondents’ IDEOLOGY by their self- placement on a tra-
ditional 11-point left–right scale. In the (very rare) cases where respondents did 
not volunteer an answer to the left–right question but responded to a party iden-
tification question, I recoded these responses into a left–right placement.3 Fourth, 
the PERSONAL SALIENCE of issues is tapped by a question about the ‘per-
sonal significance’ of the ballot issues; it reads: ‘Give me a number between 0 
and 10. 0 means no importance at all, and 10 means a very high importance. 
How important was the [name of project] for you personally?’ Fifth, to account 
for utilitarian influences on voting, for each vote I chose the three socio- 
demographic variables with the highest effect on voting decisions, out of an 
average of five variables that were considered relevant to define groups directly 
concerned by the proposal (e.g. SES, categories of non- active persons, profes-
sion, etc.). These variables were selected to measure three ‘target groups’ in each 
situation. Items were standardized across vote issues and added in a composite 
index of SELF- INTEREST, where positive values indicate a collective disposi-
tion to vote in favour of the existing social protection system.
Voting decisions
Similarly to the measure of elite support, voting decisions were recoded so that 
the higher value (1) corresponds to ‘pro- welfare’ decisions, whereas the lower 
value (0) is attributed to ‘anti- welfare’ decisions. Given the dichotomous nature 
of the dependent variable, logistic regression will be used to estimate the impact 
of information and moderator variables.4
Empirical analysis
Test of Hypothesis 1
The first question raised in this contribution is whether and how interpersonal 
information and media information interact in influencing voting decisions on 
welfare issues. To explore this question, voting decisions were simply cross- 
tabulated with both types of variables. Figure 10.1 shows the difference in 
support for welfare policies between followers and non- followers as a function 
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Difference in WS support (in %) between




















0 1 2 3
Number of anti-WS media used
Difference in WS support (in %) between
followers and non-followers 
Figure 10.1 Aggregate level of welfare support for different categories of respondents.
of their respective use of ‘pro- welfare’ and ‘anti- welfare’ media. It should be 
emphasized that the figure shows differences between categories (i.e. followers 
minus non- followers), and not absolute levels of support. These levels always 
increase (or decrease) along with the number of pro- welfare (or anti- welfare) 
media used by respondents.
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 Figure 10.1 suggests an interaction between the use of ‘pro- welfare’ media 
and the role of follower. Followers were found to be more supportive of the 
welfare system than non- followers to the extent that they used three pro- welfare 
media. To the extent that they used fewer than three such media, they were actu-
ally less supportive than non- followers. No similar relationship can be observed 
with respect to the use of anti- welfare media. To sum up, my first investigation 
of the media–interpersonal nexus suggests that seeking others’ advice enhances 
the impact of media information that is biased towards welfare state support. 
However, the reasons for the asymmetrical effectiveness of pro- and anti- welfare 
information remain unclear. While Hypotheses 1a and 1b are to be rejected, 
Hypothesis 1c is only partially supported.
Test of Hypothesis 2
In this section, I explore how the context of ballot measures influences voting 
decisions and the way in which ‘followers’ process information. In particular I 
observe whether and how the level of elite support and the climate of local 
opinion interact with both media and interpersonal information in influencing 
voting decisions. I thus check whether the effect of interpersonal sources 
becomes more evident when looked at separately within specific contexts. In 
addition, if indeed interpersonal sources appear to be ineffective in divided local 
communities (Hypothesis 2b), it remains to be seen what alternative sources of 
‘information’ (in the larger sense) are used in such contexts.
 Figure 10.2 displays the relative level of support for the welfare system 
among followers and non- followers, as a function of the number of pro- welfare 
media used and of the climate of local opinion (see the section on contextual 
variables). It is clear that assuming the role of ‘follower’ in interpersonal 
exchanges enhances the effect of pro- welfare media, except in communities that 
are divided over the ballot issues. Thus, contrary to Hypothesis 2b, there seems 
to be positive reinforcement (rather than competition) between media and inter-
personal sources, except when community opinion is split between acceptance 
and rejection of welfare policies.
 In order to find out how citizens make their voting decisions in divided com-
munities, I will now consider the effect of local opinion in more detail. To avoid 
too many and too complex interactions between predictors, I will provide for the 
role of local contexts by dividing the sample into three groups corresponding to 
‘one- sided pro- welfare’, ‘divided’ and ‘one- sided anti- welfare’ local communit-
ies. I can thus test the hypothesis that elite support serves as a heuristic cue for 
citizens in divided communities, because they cannot infer a clear ‘consensus 
heuristic’ from their interpersonal environments. Rather, citizens in such con-
texts may use the behaviour of their representatives in Parliament (and the voting 
recommendations that stem from elite behaviour) as voting cues. Further, the 
level of elite support may interact with the intensity of media use, because elite 
support cannot be experienced directly, but only through mass media coverage. 
Table 10.1 presents the results of the model for each type of context.

























































Number of pro-WS media
One-sided anti-WS Two-sided
One-sided pro-WS All contexts
Difference in WS support (in %) between
followers and non-followers 
Figure 10.2  Aggregate level of welfare support among followers and non-followers for 
different media exposure levels and in different types of local communities.
 Beginning with one- sided anti- welfare contexts, one may first notice that the 
influence of the media appears very weak, either as direct effects or in inter-
action with other variables. One exception is the interaction between the number 
of anti- welfare media used and the squared level of elite support. This effect sug-
gests that anti- welfare media were not effective when elite support was interme-
diate, but that they did matter for voting decisions when the elite was either 
clearly supportive or clearly unsupportive. Converting the regression coefficients 
into probabilities, increasing the number of anti- welfare media from zero to three 
translates into a 0.34 and 0.27 lower predicted likelihood of voting in favour of 
welfare policies in cases of small (–1 sd) and large (+1 sd) elite support, respec-
tively, while it brings about a slightly higher likelihood of welfare support in 
cases of average elite support (i.e. holding other variables constant, as will be 
done throughout the rest of this section). A similar interaction was observed 
between elite support and the role of ‘follower’. Followers were more supportive 
of the welfare state than non- followers, but only when Parliament was divided 
(about 0.10 higher likelihood of pro- welfare voting). In other situations, follow-
ers were actually less enthusiastic about welfare policies than were non- followers 
(about 0.20 difference). This is clearly inconsistent with Hypothesis 2a.
 In divided local contexts, the results suggest that the level of elite support for 
the welfare system may have been used as a heuristic, thus consistent with 
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Hypothesis 2c. As a matter of fact, voting in favour of the welfare system was 
much more likely when elite support was rather strong, but not at its strongest 
level (as evidenced by the negative squared term). However, as the elite support 
vs. media interaction shows, this pattern holds only among citizens who used 
pro- welfare media in the first place – for people who used no such media, the 
level of elite support hardly had any impact on voting. Thus, for levels of elite 
support slightly above average, increasing the number of pro- welfare media from 
zero to three translates into a full 0.25 higher predicted likelihood of voting in 
favour of welfare policies. This makes sense insofar as elite support must be 
communicated by the media for citizens to be able to use it as an alternative 
voting cue in the absence of clear signals from interpersonal environments. Let 
us also stress that both pro- welfare and anti- welfare media had their strongest 
direct influence on voting in these local communities with split opinion about 
welfare policies, thus lending support to Hypothesis 2b.
 Finally, the level of elite support did not have as strong an effect in pro- 
welfare communities as in divided communities. Nevertheless, it was involved 
in various interactions with communication variables. First, pro- welfare media 
were much more effective in attracting pro- welfare votes when Parliament was 
rather opposed to the welfare system and was thus at odds with local senti-
ments. Similarly, anti- welfare media were much more successful in getting anti-
 welfare votes when parliamentary opinion was contradicted by local opinion. In 
cases of low elite support (i.e. –0.5 sd; lower levels were virtually non- existent 
in reality), increasing the number of (pro- welfare or anti- welfare) media from 
zero to three translates into a (positive or negative) change of about 0.30 in the 
predicted likelihood of voting in favour of welfare policies. For higher levels of 
elite support, the predicted impact of the media was more limited and even pos-
sibly counterproductive. In addition, these results are qualified by the three- way 
interactions between elite support, media use and the role of follower. One of 
the many ways of looking at these interactions is to observe that, within com-
munities that are at odds with parliamentary elites, the influence of the media 
was especially pronounced among followers. In the rare cases of low elite 
support, a three- unit increase in the number of (either pro- welfare or anti- 
welfare) media is predicted to yield a 0.55 change in the likelihood of pro- 
welfare voting among followers, while it amounts to about 0.30 among 
non- followers. Moreover, the predicted rate of change in the probability of pro- 
welfare voting induced by media exposure declines sharply as a function of 
elite support among followers, while the decay is much more gradual among 
non- followers.
 In sum, the evidence is consistent with Hypotheses 2b and 2c, but not with 
Hypothesis 2a. When local opinion is divided over an issue, the impact of media 
sources is heightened, and the level of elite support is likely to be used as a 
voting cue. No clear evidence could be adduced to show the impact of interper-
sonal sources in divided communities, though. Furthermore, some of the non- 
hypothesized information effects evidenced in non- divided contexts deserve 
further examination.
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In this study I have tested several hypotheses about the processing of political 
information by citizens and its consequences for voting decisions. Applying the 
model to survey data about 22 ballot votes on social policy in Switzerland 
(1996–2004), my study yielded a number of results.
 By and large, my analysis points to a reinforcement mechanism between 
media and interpersonal information. That is, citizens who asked for others’ 
advice were more susceptible to the influence of the media that they used to 
make up their minds about the ballot issues. The mechanisms leading to rein-
forcement are unclear though, as this question cannot be addressed with the data 
at hand. On the one hand, media information may ‘set the agenda’ for interper-
sonal conversations, which might then serve to crystallize opinions brought 
about by the media. Alternatively, voters may become aware of issues through 
conversations and may then use media information to validate information and 
ideas acquired through interpersonal exchanges.
 I found two important exceptions to the general reinforcement pattern, 
though, and a number of qualifications. First, the interaction between the role of 
‘follower’ in interpersonal exchanges and media exposure is limited to the case 
of media that promoted the acceptance of the welfare system. Clear- cut results 
could not be obtained with respect to ‘anti- welfare’ media. Second, the rein-
forcement between the role of ‘follower’ and exposure to pro- welfare media 
does not seem to apply to situations where popular opinion was divided at the 
local level. I hypothesized that in such situations citizens cannot resort to some 
‘consensus heuristic’ from their interpersonal environments.
 However, information effects are qualified by the role of moderator variables, 
allowing me to describe the situation of divided local contexts as a ‘special case’ 
rather than as an ‘exception’. Indeed, the conclusion that interpersonal and media 
information do not interact in such contexts is mitigated by considering the role 
of elite support. The degree of support for ballot proposals in Parliament may 
serve as a substitute to political discussions, since voters’ support for welfare 
policies was highest in cases where elite support was moderately strong. The fact 
that voters’ support was not strongest for ballot issues that received the strongest 
support in Parliament makes sense to the extent that undisputed issues usually 
give way to few mobilization efforts and to unimportant referendum campaigns. 
Therefore the leaders’ position is less easily communicated in such cases than 
when ballot proposals enjoy less support in Parliament but lead to more intense 
referendum campaigns. Further, this relation holds only for citizens who used 
the media in the first place, suggesting that elite support is communicated 
through the media or that referendum campaigns (which are usually reflective of 
the balance of power in Parliament) play a key role in the formation of voting 
decisions.
 Besides, the level of support in Parliament was also found to matter in the 
other types of local contexts. First, in local environments predominantly opposed 
to welfare policies, the capacity of anti- welfare media and interpersonal informa-
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tion to alienate voters from the welfare system was severely constrained when 
the Parliament was divided over issues. It may be that information is less effect-
ive (or its measurement through simple indicators less valid) when political 
leaders are divided, because the total information flow is then usually more 
intense and less biased towards a single viewpoint. Second, in local contexts that 
predominantly endorsed the welfare system, the media were especially effective 
to the extent that these contexts were at odds with anti- welfare votes in Parlia-
ment. It would take us well beyond the scope of this discussion to analyse the 
reasons for this interaction; however, it should be noted that such ‘people against 
elites’ situations are quite exceptional.
 These results are all the more significant as they were obtained after control-
ling for the influence of variables known to be strong predictors of welfare state 
voting (ideology, self- interest, etc.). Nevertheless, the model tested here is only 
moderately successful in explaining voting decisions on welfare policy. There 
might be at least three reasons why only limited effects emerged from the analy-
sis. First, the measurement of media and interpersonal communication flows is 
arguably less than ideal. Second, real effects may indeed be modest. In fact, 
other research (e.g. Marquis 2006) has shown that the potential for referendum 
campaigns and face- to-face contacts to influence Swiss voters is rather limited. 
Third, although the effects of media and interpersonal information appear weak, 
one should stress that these variables interact with contextual variables and that 
their effect is indirect rather than direct.
 Another point of criticism, levelled against many analyses of social policies 
using survey data, points to the ambiguity of the concept of ‘welfare state 
support’ (for a review, see Ullrich 2000). Although the problem is less serious 
here, because voting decisions are to be explained, and not elusive or superficial 
‘opinions’, one may cast doubt on the assumption that all respondents in my 
dataset are endorsing or opposing the same fundamental position towards the 
welfare state. Because no fewer than 22 ballot votes have been included in this 
analysis, representing at least five distinct domains of state intervention, the 
general goal of generalization pursued here can only be achieved at the expense 
of the specifics of each issue area. Thus it might be that my model accounts rela-
tively well for decision- making towards some issues but that it requires better 
specification for other issues.
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Appendix 10.1 List of ballot votes
Vox # Date Project Project type
602 Dec. 1996 Law on labour: weekend and night work, 
maternity
Retrenchment
622 Sept. 1997 Financing of unemployment insurance Retrenchment
643 Sept. 1998 Tenth amendment of pension system without 
increase of retirement age 
Expansion
654 Nov. 1998 Law on labour: night work, maternity Expansiona
684 June 1999 Law on disability insurance Retrenchment
685 June 1999 Law on maternity insurance Expansion
721 Nov. 2000 Initiative against increase of retirement age for 
women 
Expansion
722 Nov. 2000 Initiative for ‘flexible retirement age from 62 
years’
Expansion
724 Nov. 2000 Initiative for ‘reduced hospital costs’ Populist
732 March 2001 Initiative for ‘cheaper drugs’ Populist
752 Dec. 2001 Initiative to ‘secure pension system – tax energy 
instead of labour’ 
Expansion
762 March 2002 Reduction of work time Expansion
781 Sept. 2002 Initiative about gold reserves to retirement 
pension 
Populist
782 Sept. 2002 Counter-proposal about gold reserves to 
retirement pension
Expansion
792 Nov. 2002 Law on unemployment insurance: 
unemployment benefits
Retrenchment
802 Feb. 2003 Participation of cantons in financing of hospital 
treatments
Expansion
815 May 2003 Initiative ‘health must remain affordable’ Expansion
816 May 2003 Initiative ‘equal rights for disabled people’ Expansion
819 May 2003 Initiative for ‘sufficient apprenticeship places’ Expansion
831 May 2004 Eleventh amendment of pension system: 
increased retirement age for women
Retrenchment
832 May 2004 Financing of retirement pension through VAT 
increase
Expansion
844 Sept. 2004 Law on maternity insurance Expansion
Note
a  This project is difficult to assign to a particular category, since it contains both “expansion” and 
‘retrenchment’ features. However, for the sake of simplicity, it was classified in the “expansion” 
category.
Notes
1 As a matter of fact, the impact of each single medium varies from one issue to the next. 
Because the effect of each medium is unknown a priori and unlikely to remain constant 
across the 22 ballot issues, allowing each medium to have a distinctive effect on the 
whole- sample voting measure would lead to a serious underestimation of media effects. 
However, the adopted solution (i.e. selecting only the media shown previously to exert 
the largest influence on voting decisions) raises concern about possible endogeneity 
bias, because the dependent variable is used to determine how individuals are distrib-
uted over the values of the explanatory variables. However, as pointed out by Terza et 
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al. (2008), standard methods of checking for endogeneity (e.g. the instrumental varia-
bles method) are not suited for models with binary dependent variables. As a first rough 
assessment of endogeneity bias, I simply estimated the covariance between the media 
variables and the error term of the simple (logistic) model: vote = C + B1(pro- 
media) + B2(anti- media) + e. This analysis shows the possible bias to be negligible.
2 Populist proposals emanate from right- wing nationalist parties and groups, and are 
opposed by other (in particular left- wing) parties. They consist of ‘radical’, often ‘sim-
plistic’, solutions to welfare problems, usually charging ‘big business’, high- profit 
sectors, or available public wealth – such as proposals to reduce the price of drugs or to 
reallocate the National Bank’s gold reserves to retirement pensions.
3 About 2 per cent of respondents were thus recoded into left–right categories (coding 
scheme available upon request from the author). Further, I also used party identifica-
tion in order to remedy the problem of a very high concentration of responses at the 
scale midpoint. Respondents who identified with left parties were shifted one point to 
the left (i.e. 4) and the increment for right identifiers was one point to the right (i.e. 6). 
A non- recoded left–right variable was also used in the various analyses but differences 
were found to be immaterial.
4 One may ask about the opportunity of using alternative tools such as multilevel analy-
sis (MLA), so as to allow for unexplained variability to be partitioned between differ-
ent conceptual levels and to get more robust and realistic estimates of the variance of 
effects. However, it is not entirely clear whether MLA is appropriate to analysing my 
data. Because the number of higher- level units is rather low (i.e. 22 ballots) and, con-
versely, the number of observations per unit is quite large (i.e. 517 respondents on 
average), the difference between traditional regression models and multilevel models is 
expected to be rather limited (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 44). In addition, it is doubtful 
that the rather heterogeneous basis of ballot votes investigated here can be regarded as 
a sample from a ‘population of votes’, in which the discrete units can be considered as 
interchangeable, as MLA implies.
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